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FOREIGN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: THE ROLE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES
by
Joy Cherian*
INTRODUCTION
Until recently, many international business lawyers had been
skeptical about the future of the International Center for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID), an institution designed to resolve "legal
disputes" arising from private investment abroad. ICSID was established
in October 1966 by the Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, sponsored by the
World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development).1
This skepticism was generally based on two reasons. First, arbitral
institutions have historically been ineffective in the enforcement and
execution of foreign investment arbitral awards granted in favor of
foreign private investors against foreign governments. Although several
prominent private arbitration institutions around the world have
successfully resolved "commercial disputes" between foreign enterprises
and governmental agencies, they were not often effective in resolving
legal disputes arising out of foreign "private investments." Most of ten,
losing disputant countries invoked sovereign immunity claims or public
policy considerations against enforcement of those awards.
ICSID however, is apparently overcoming this problem. Eighty-seven
countries2 have already pledged their support to the ICSID arbitration
mechanism. Many have either included ICSID arbitration clauses in their
international investment agreements with foreign investors or
incor orated treaty provisions on ICSID within their own domestic
laws.9 These developments are particularly encouraging with respect to
the commitment of those countries which are traditionally
capital-receiving. Maurice Mendelson, a legal scholar, observed,
"Although not the only system in existence for the settlement of disputes
between states and foreign investors, the Washington Convention (1965
World Bank Convention) is one of the most refined instruments available
for performing this function."'4
The second reason for skepticism was the limited number of
arbitration proceedings actually held before ICSID tribunals.5 This
writer and a few others have suggested that the number of arbitration
proceedings should not be a criterion to evaluate the usefulness of the
ICSID arbitration mechanism, because ICSID acts as a deterrent to
possible disputes between many contracting countries of the ICSID
convention (1965 World Bank Convention) and foreign private
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investors. 6 This argument was questioned by D. Kokkini-Iatridou, a
prominent legal scholar, who in reaching his conclusion quoted B.A.S.
Petren, Judge of the International Court of Justice:
In the case of a hospital the absence of clients
could, of course, mean that the health situation in
the district was an excellent one. Should, however,
potential patients fail to appear at the hospital
because they prefer having their illnesses cured
elsewhere, or not cured at all, the hospital's doctors
would have little reason to indulge in self-laudatory
jubilation!7
Although Judge Petran was referring to the International Court of
Justice, Professor Kokkini-Iatridou thought ICSID might be in a similar
situation. But Mendelson, in his review of this writer's book,
Investment Contracts and Arbitration, observed:
[T]he efficacy of a watch-dog ought not to be gauged
solely by reference to the number of burglars it
bites, and it is the experience of this reviewer and
of others that States and investors take rather
seriously the existence of clauses in investment
contracts providing for arbitration under the auspices
of ICSID.8
Recognition of the above facts and arguments has effectively eroded
the skepticism mentioned earlier. Confidence in ICSID has further
increased as ICSID tribunals have already graTed three major awards9
and are resolving a number of other disputes, and many investors and
foreign governments have included ICSID arbitration clauses in their
investment agreements.
In light of these views and observations, lawyers should examine more
closely ICSID's role in the resolution of foreign investment disputes.
For this purpose this paper has been divided into three maser parts: the
first, historical and operational background of the ICSID;" the
second, applicable law of ICSID arbitration;12 and the third,
enforcement, recognition, and execution of the award. The first and
second parts are revised versions of the discussions in this writer's
book, Investment Contracts and Arbitration.
PART ONE: HISTORICAL AND OPERATIONAL BACKGROUND OF THE ICSID
A. The Development of the ICSID--Historical Perspective
The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes came into
force on October 14, 1966, thirty days after the deposit of the twentieth
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instrument of ratification. 1 3 By the end of December 1981, eighty-one
nations from both developed and developing areas had become parties to
the Convention; a further six countries had signed, but had not yet
ratified the Convention. 
4
The ICSID was established in response to the perceived unavailability
of adequate machinery for international conciliation and
arbitration.15  This deficiency often frustrated attempts to agree on
an appropriate mode for the settlement of investment disputes between
sovereign governments and private foreign investors.1 6 Tribunals set
up by private organizations such as the American Arbitration Association,
the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission and the
International Chamber of Commerce1 7 were frequentl unacceptable to
several governments to settle investment disputes.Y° Furthermore, the
only existing public international arbitral tribunal, the Permanent Court
of Arbitration, was not open to private investors.19 Additionally, all
attempts by different agencies to establish conventions20 to provide
facilities for the settlement of investment disputes have resulted in the
dissatisfaction of different interested partles. 2'
This particular situation was considered by the Economic and Social
Council of the United Nations,22 but the U.N. has not contributed
anything to the resolution of investment disputes abroad other than a
General Assembly resolution which requested the U.N. Secretariat to
continue its work in cooperation with the World Bank to provide
facilities for achieving an effective and satisfactory method of settling
foreign investor-capital-importing disputes.23 The World Bank had
already had some experience in facilitating the settlement of disputes
between member governments and private investors,24 but prior to its
establishment of the ICSID the Bank was not equipped to perform these
tasks on a regular basis.2 According to one observation:
This past experience of the Bank led to the feeling
that the creation of some specialized forum for the
settlement of these disputes (which would also
contribute to improvement of the investment climate)
should be investigated.26
At its 1962 annual meeting, the Bank's Board of Governors adopted a
resolution27 requesting that the Executive Directors study the
possibility of the establishment of an arbitration forum to settle
investment disputes between host governments and foreign investors. As a
result of this resolution, the World Bank initiated the Convention of
196528 with the objective of encouraging a greater flow of private
investment2 9 for the purpose of accelerating the economic growth of
developing countries by resolving legal disputes arising out of foreign
investment programs between the capital-exporting foreign nationals and
the receiving host states.
It has been noted that this Convention was the first and, so far, the
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only attempt since 1945 to get beyond the developing stages in providing
protection for investments abroad on a multilateral and potentially
universal scale.30 Finally, on October 14, 1966, the Convention
established the International Center for Settlement of Investment
Disputes as a new ancillary organization within the World Bank group 31
in order to provide facilities for conciliation and arbitration to
resolve investment disputes between contracting states and nationals of
other contracting states.
B. The Operational Structure of the ICSID and its Arbitral Tribunals
1. The Organs of the ICSID and their Major Functions
The major organs of the ICSID are the Administrative Council 32 and
the Secretariat. 3 The Administrative Council is composed of one
representative of each Contracting State. The president of the World
Bank serves ex officio as the Chairman of the Council, but has no voting
power.
The Secretariat is headed by a Secretary-General, 34 elected by a
two-thirds mayority of the Administrative Council on the nomination of
the Chairman, for a period of six years. The Convention requires the
Secretary-General to perform various administrative functions such those
of legal representative, registrar and principal officer of the ICSID.
2. Jurisdiction of the ICSID and Nature of the Dispute
The ICSID can extend its jurisdiction to any legal dispute arising
directly out of an investment between a contracting state or any agency
of that contracting state and a natural person or a juridical person
belonging to another contracting state.3' Consent of the parties is
the cornerstone of the jurisdiction of the Center.36 Consent to the
jurisdiction must be in writing and, once given, cannot be withdrawn
unilaterally. "Consent" may be given, for example, in an arbitration
clause included in a transnational economic development contract
(TEDC)37 providing for the submission38 to the Center of future legal
disputes arising out of that agreement or in a compromise regarding a
legal dispute which has already arisen.39 A capital-receiving state
may in its investment promotion legislation offer to submit a legal
disputes arising out of certain classes of investments to the
jurisdiction of the Center. The investor may give his consent by
accepting the offer in writing. 40 The right of a foreign investor to
submit a claim to the Center depends upon the condition that his national
state and the disputing state already have signed the ICSID
Convention. 41
The reference to a legal dispute 42 in Article 25 limits
jurisdiction in one important regard. Referring to this aspect of the
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provision, the Executive Directors of the World Bank have commented that
the expression "legal dispute" had been used to make clear that while
conflicts of rights were within the jurisdiction 43 of the Center, mere
conflicts of interests were not. The dispute must concern the existence
or scope of legal right or obligation, or the nature or extent of the
reparation to be made for breach of a legal obligation.4 4
3. Arbitration Tribunals Under the ICSID
a. Panels of Arbitrators. Article 3 requires the ICSID to maintain
a Panel of Conciliators and a Panel of Arbitrators, and Article 14(l)
seeks to insure that Panel members will possess a high degree of
competence and be capable of exercising independent judgment. 45
However, the Convention permits parties in a dispute to appoint
arbitrators from outside the Panels but requires that such appointees
possess the qualities described under Article 14(1):
Persons designated to serve on the Panels shall be
persons of high moral character and recognized
competence in the field of law, commerce, industry or
finance, who may be relied upon to exercise
independent judgment. Competence in the field of law
shall be of particular importance in the case of
persons on the Panel of Arbitrators. 46
As the wording of Article 14(1) indicates, there is no absolute
requirement that arbitrators be trained in the law. This point raises
serious doubt as to how non-legal experts appointed by the parties or the
Chairman of the Administrative Council can perform as arbitrators, for
arbitration is a judicial method 47 of settling legal disputes.48
However, the assurance under Article 14(2) that the Chairman will pay due
regard to the importance of the representation of principal legal systems
of the world provides some assurance to lawyers who may question the
required qualifications of the arbitrators. But this assurance applies
only to appointments of arbitrators by the Chairman, not by the disputing
parties.
b. Formation of the Arbitral Tribunal. After receiving a written
request4' from any contracting state or any national of a contracting
state wishing to institute an arbitration proceeding, the arbitral
tribunal must be formed as soon as possible.50 The tribunal may
consist of a sole arbitrator or any uneven number of arbitrators. 51  In
the absence of an agreement between the parties on the number of
arbitrators, the tribunal will consist of three arbitrators, one
arbitrator appointed by each party, and the president of the tribunal by
the common agreement of the parties.52 If the tribunal is not
constituted within ninety days after the registration of the written
request, the Chairman of the ICSID Administrative Council will appoint
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either the sole arbitrator or all arbitrators of the tribunal after
consulting with the disputing parties. Unlike nominees agreed to by the
parties, nominees of the Chairman must be nationals of countries other
than those of the parties in the dispute.53
c. Powers and Function of the Tribunal. Before acting on an
arbitration, all the members of the tribunal must sign a declaration that
they will judge the dispute fairly according to the applicable law.54
The tribunal is the judge of its own competence and is empowered to make
rulings on the extent of its jurisdiction. 55 As early as possible
after the tribunal has been constituted, the president and members of the
tribunal endeavour to ascertain the views of the parties regarding
questions of procedure, 56 including the quorum 57 of the tribunal at
its hearing, the usage of the language of the proceedings, matters
relating to oral and written procedure, and the cost of the
proceedings. 58 This rule enables the tribunal to create an atmosphere
of cooperation with disputants and provides a concrete procedural
framework.59 This preliminary procedural consultation of the tribunal
with the parties may help the parties reach some understanding on issues
involved with the taking of evidence,6 0 the admissibility of
counterclaims,61 the determination of the law that the tribunal is to
apply, 62 and its power to decide the dispute ex aequo et bono if the
parties agree.
PART TWO: APPLICABLE LAW OF ICSID ARBITRATION
A crucial question in any arbitration is the choice of law.63
Article 42 of the SID Convention resolves this problem by establishing
certain specific directives to the arbitral tribunal:
(1) The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance
with such rules of law as may be agreed by the
parties. In the absence of such agreement, the
Tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting State
party to the dispute (including its rules on the
conflict of laws) and such rules of international law
as may be applicable.
(2) The Tribunal may not bring in a finding of non
liquet on the ground of silence or obscurity of the
law.
(3) The provision of paragraphs (1) and (2) shall not
prejudice the power of the Tribunal to decide a
dispute ex aequo et bono if the parties so agree.
An attempt will be made in the following paragraphs to explain what
the wording of Article 42 means and what it meant to those who drafted
it, in the light of discussions held during the various stages64 of the
SID Convention.
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A. Party Autonomy Under Article 42(1)
It is clear from the first provision of Article 42(1) that the
article recognizes the subjective theory of choice of law based on the
principle of party autonomy or the will of the parties.65
The first sentence of Article 42(1) may be construed as an implicit
rejection of the proposition proposals that contracts between states and
foreign investors could be legally self-sufficient, so as to exist
independently of other legal systems, municipal or international. 66 If
this interpretation is accepted, the determination of the legal systems
which can be chosen by the parties to the dispute as applicable to their
relations is of paramount importance.67 The absolute freedom of choice
of law permitted parties may lead to the adoption of any legal system or
combination of legal systems, such as the law of the host state or that
law with certain modifications or qualifications, 68 the law of the
investor's state, or a third state's law with or without qualification in
international law defined under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice.69 Whatever may be the law selected by
the parties to be applicable, the ICSID tribunal is bound to respect the
choice of law by those parties. Thus, if the parties wish to restrict
the power of the tribunal from applying either the law of the contracting
state or international law as provided by Article 42(2), they can do so.
B. Subsidiary Rules Under Article 42(1)
The remainder of Article 42(1) provides subsidiary rules for the
arbitration when the parties have failed to prescribe the applicable
law. In other words, where the parties to a TEDC, by an oversight, or
because they could not agree, or because of their feeling that the
arbitral tribunal was best qualified to decide the question of choice of
law, did not reach agreement as to the law applicable, the second
sentence under Article 42(1) requires the tribunal to look to two
sources, viz. firstly to the national law of the contracting country
where the investment took place and secondly to relevant rules of
international law. 70 Thus, by establishing a specific direction to the
tribunal, Article 42(1) eliminates the confusion on a fundamental
problem: what law is the applicable law for arbitration in the absence of
an agreement between a foreign investor and a contracting state on an
appropriate applicable law.7I
There is no doubt of the appropriateness of applying the law of the
contracting state in accordance with Article 42(0) by the ICSID tribunal
whenever the question of choice of law arises during an arbitration
relating to a TEDC. 72 However, some municipal laws of developing
countries often have gaps that make it impossible for the ICSID tribunal
to settle the dispute purely through their application. 73 The SID
Convention provides that the tribunal "not bring in a finding of non
liquet on the ground of silence or obscurity of the law." 74. Therefore,
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Article 42(2) requires the tribunal to look elsewhere for an applicable
law if that of the contracting state is inadequate, and by implication
requires the tribunal to so look. The tribunal may apply the contracting
states' rules on conflicts of laws in order to ascertain some other
applicable body of law, and "such rules of international law as may be
applicable."
The Report of the Executive Directors of the World Bank on the SID
Convention dated March 18, 1965, clarifies the term "International Law"
as used in Article 42(1). The report says:
The term 'international law' as used in this context
Should be understood in the sense given to it by
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice, allowance being made for the fact
that Article 38 was designed to apply to international
disputes.75
The reference to international law had rightly been recognized from
the start of the Convention as an important matter and had been debated
at length at various stages of the Convention. The provision under
Article 42(1) relating to the application of international law reached
its existing form after three major draft stages of the Convention,
namely a preliminary draft, a first draft and a final draft. 76 The
following paragraphs will examine what these stages meant to the
participants of the Convention.
a. The Preliminary Draft. Section 4(1) of Article IV of the
Preliminary Draft, which was submitted to regional consultative meetings
of government representatives, dealt with international law as follows:
In the absence of agreement between the parties
concerning the law to be applied, and unless the
parties shall have given the Tribunal the power to
decide ex aeguo et bono, the Tribunal shall decide the
dispute submitted to it in accordance with rules of
law, whether national or international, as it shall
determine to be applicable. 77
The majority of legal experts who participated in the regional
consultative meetings found the provision basically acceptable.
Howevever, there were objections to the freedom of the tribunal to apply
international law. It was argued at the Bangkok (Thailand) Regional
Meeting by the delegate from China that the act of making an investment
in a host country normally implied that the investor had already given
consent to the jurisdiction of the national law of the host state in all
aspects of the contract.78 Therefore, the tribunal should apply the
law of the contracting state and should not be permitted to apply
international law in the absence of a specific agreement authorizing the
-180-
tribunal to do so, and the Convention should so provide.79 The Indian
delegate supported the observation of the Chinese representative. 80
A. Broches, Chairman of the Regional Meeting, commented that this
proposal would not be acceptable.8I He said that there is no reason to
require the litigants specifically to empower the tribunal to do
something that every arbitral tribunal i called upon to do in every case
involving an international transaction. 8  With respect to the issue of
national as opposed to international law, Mr. Broches said that two
points should be noted. First, the basic function of the Convention is
the establishment of an international jurisdiction, and it is reasonable
to provide that an international tribunal will have the power to apply
international law unless specifically restricted. Secondly, even an
international tribunal would have to look first to national law, since
the relationship between the investors and the host state is governed in
the first instance by national law and it would be set aside only on
those occasions in which that national law was in violation of
international law. 83
b. The First Draft. In light of the discussion at the regional
consultative meetings on the preliminary draft, the first draft of the
Convention was prepared and submitted to the Legal Committee by the World
Bank staff for further consideration. Article 45(1) of the new draft
dealt with provisions relating to applicable law. It said:
In the absence of agreement between the parties
concerning the law to be applied, the Tribunal shall
decide the dispute submitted to it in accordance with
such rules of national and international law as it
shall determine to be applicable. The term
"international law" shall be understood in the sense
given to it by Article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice.84
This new revised draft did not incorporate the above-described
objections to Article IV, Section 4(1) of the preliminary draft, which
had been minority views. The significant change in the new provision on
international law was the addition of a definition of the term
"international law" and replacement of the words "such rules of law
whether national or international" by "such rules of national and
international law." The first change became necessary in response to
doubts expressed concerning the meaning of the term "international law"
in the context of the Convention. The second change was actually
intended to refute any inference that the tribunal would have to choose
between national and international law.
Again, the mention of the term "international law" under Article
45(1) of the new draft attracted lengthy and spirited discussion during
the Legal Committee Meeting. One delegate remarked that the reference to
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international law should be qualified and that it should be made
applicable only in cases where discrimination was alleged. 85 In other
cases, the law applicable should be that of the country where the
investment was made because it was on the basis of that law that the
investment agreement was signed.86 Referring to this remark, Broches,
Chairman of the Meeting, pointed out that as one could not foresee all
the cases in which international law might be applicable, the citation of
examples such as "discrimination" might not be very useful.87 He added
that the provision was an accurate reflection of the considerations an
arbitral tribunal would have to go through where the parties failed to
reach specific agreement on the choice of law.88
Some delegates89 objected to the reference to "international law."
They argued that the tribunal should not be authorized to review the
domestic legislation of sovereign states and no law other than the
national law of the host state should be applied by the tribunal. They
insisted that even the contracting parties should not be permitted to
derogate from this principle.
According to one delegate, contracts between private persons and
states had not been governed by customary international law. If such a
development of the law was necessary, he thought the proper body to
achieve it was the International Law Commission. He felt that in any
event it would be insufficient merely to say that a contractual
relationship would be subordinated to international law. It would be
necessary to work out in detail the principles, the rights, and the
obligations that would be acceptable to the parties before any country
was asked to sign the Convention. Otherwise, the full implications of
the Convention would not be revealed to the signatories. He thought that
the adoption of this provision might result in the actions of a state of
a purely domestic or internal nature being tested by an uncertain set of
principles. This would run counter to the doctrine of sovereignty of
states. The newly independent states of Asia and Africa were willing to
accept and abide by the principles of public international law, but were
not in favour of expanding the scope of their application. In fact,
there had been a persistent demand by these states for the modification
of some of the principles of international law which had been created
solely to protect the interests of the industrial and colonial powers.
The arbitral tribunals would continue to apply the existing law with its
imperfections. So long as these imperfections existed, and they could be
solved only by an accommodation of balancing of such forces, and not by
judicial action, agreeing to this Convention would reaffirm the present
system.90
Another delegate 9l observed that international law might be
applicable to a particular dispute, but only when the national law of the
host country provided for such application of international law. He
further pointed out that the general principles of international law are
embodied in the national laws of most countries and that these principles
would be applied to the cases of discriminatory action. Several
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delegates said that they might accept the application of international
law in those cases where the national law of the host country would be
absolutely silent or where there are lacunae. 92
Against the objections and comments mentioned above, it was pointed
out in the Legal Committee Meeting that there was nothing in Article
45(1) of the draft which would authorize a tribunal to disregard national
law generally and the principles of international law which might be
brought into play would be such as pacta sunt servanda.93 It was
pointed out that the question of pacta sunt servanda would arise whenever
a concession agreement was unilaterally terminated by a law of the host
state and an issue arises from that termination whether or not the state
was acting in good faith.94
The Austrian delegate95 mentioned at the Legal Committee Meeting
that countries such as his own would not have difficulties with respect
to the application of international law. The West German delegate96
indicated that there were many countries in which national courts must
apply international law as well as national law and that it would seem
strange if a tribunal which was admittedly international were precluded
from applying international law. The question of the exhaustion of local
remedies, for example, would require the application of certain rules of
international law. 7  In addition, the delegate pointed out that the
initial words of Article 45 of the draft, indicating that the disputing
parties could agree otherwise, should dispel the doubts that had been
expressed.9 8 For this reason, he was strongly in favor of the present
wording of Article 45(1). Another delegate 9 added that cases of state
succession would be another occasion for the arbitral tribunal to apply
international law. The United States delegate said that he considered
Article 45 satisfactory and pointed out that it was his country's
understanding that national law would usually be applied. He further
suggested that it was important to provide for the possibility of
applying international law since, under Article 27, a contracting state
would have to waive the right of diplomatic protection of its nationals
before SID tribunals.1 00
c. The Final Draft. Finally, after considering all remarks of the
delegates, the Legal Committee adopted by a majority of twenty-four a new
provision to preserve the freedom of the tribunal to apply international
law both in case of a lacuna in either domestic law of the host state or
international law.1 01 It will be noted that the definition of the term
"international law" which appeared in Article 45(1) of the First Draft
was omitted from the present form of the final test of the second
sentence of Article 42(1) of the SID Convention.
Aron Broches considered that the final text of Article 42(l) achieves
all the objectives that could be reasonably pursued within the framework
of the Convention.1 02 Further, Mr. Broches optimistically commented on
the possibility of the application of international law:
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The history of the provision leaves no doubt, in my
opinion, that the tribunal may apply international
law i) where national law calls for its
application, (ii) where the subject matter is
directly regulated by international law (a case which
may not be easily distinguishable in practice from
(i)), and (iii) where national law or action taken
thereunder violates international law.103
C. The Rule on Non Liquet Under Article 42(2)
Article 42(2) directs: "The tribunal may not bring in a finding of
non liquet on the ground of silence or obscurity of law." Non liquet is
the phrase used by a tribunal when it confesses an inability to give a
verdict because the available legal rules are insufficient, uncertain, or
lacking in clarity.
The provision of prohibiting non liquetI04 was originally
incorporated with Article IV, Section 4(2) of the Preliminary Draft of
the SID Convention.10 5 There were no debates on this provision and
subsequently it was approved without any objection b the regional
meetings and finally by the Legal Committee Meeting.Y06 Thus, the
Convention specifically directed that a tribunal would not be excused
from rendering an award on the ground that law is not sufficiently
clear. In other words, the Convention required that a decision be
reached by the tribunal in every arbitration submitted for its
consideration.
On scholar suggested that the non liquet problem has sometimes
incorrectly been placed under a widely extended notion of
non-justiciability.10 7
Non-justiciability in the more precise sense is
concerned with the overriding assertion of certain
State interests even when they may be contra or at
least extra legem. Non liquet comes into arguments
rather when applicable rules of appropriate content
and precision are simply not available for adjusting
the particular clash of interest.108
Further, according to the same writer, the non liquet question inevitably
would draw into controversy both the source of validity of international
law and the authority of international tribunals to develop, adapt, and
create rules of new content. He added, "[H]ighly speculative questions
of legal theory as well as very technical legal questions, have become
entangled in it."1 09
Stone's view is relevant to a study of the power of the international
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tribunals of the ICSID. There is always a possibility in an ICSID
arbitration between a foreign private investor and a developing country
for a finding of non liquet. For instance, in a dispute relating to the
protection of interests of both a private foreign investor and a
developing country, when an ICSID arbitral tribunal applies the municipal
law of the host state it may be revealed that the law of the host state
is silent or obscurellO in the matter of protection of certain vested
or acquired rights of the foreign investor. The tribunal which tries to
apply international law may find that international law does not possess
sufficient principles or rules relating to national economic or welfare
interests of the developing country.1 1 In these circumstances, the
tribunal may show a tendency to avoid the responsibility of giving the
award on the rules of law, since the case may be interrelated with new
issues of national and international law which are not yet settled by any
international convention. Article 42(2) prohibits such an outcome in any
arbitration brought before an ICSID tribunal.
There is no doubt that the consent of the contracting states to
approve this specific provision as a guideline for the tribunal is a
valuable contribution to the law of international arbitration. Although
the International Law Commission has previously recommended the
prohibition of non lig! findings in its Draft on Model Rules for
Arbitral Procedu-re, ± Z this is the first time that a large group of
countries have agreed on the introduction of a general prohibition of non
liquet in an international arbitration convention. Perhaps this
provision may even inspire the members of the tribunal to accept radical
principles and rules in order to resolve certain cases involved with the
protection of foreign private investment relating to the economic
development of developing countries.
D. The Maxim Ex Aequo Et Bono Under Article 42(3)
According to Article 42(3), the parties in a dispute may give the
arbitral tribunal the power to decide a matter ex aequo et bono; that is,
to decide in accordance with what is just and equitable in particular
circumstances rather than by application of rules of law.I 13 The
authority given to the tribunal in an arbitration to decide a case ex
aeguo et bono merely empowers it to apply the principles of equity in the
broader signification of the latter word.11 4 This means the maxim ex
aeguo et bono will provide an opportunity to arbitrators to apply certain
equitable principles to render an award on the basis of good conscience,
fairness and justice.
Article 42(3) is a reproduction of Section 2 of Article 38 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice.1 15 It is also
compatible with the Section 2 of Article 9 of the 1953 Draft Convention
on Arbitral procedure sponsored by the International Law
Commission.1 16 The proposal to include a provision on ex aeguo et bono
among Articles of the SID Convention dia not draw debate either in the
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regional meetings of the Draft Convention or in the Washington Conference
of Legal Experts.
In an arbitration where the parties are agreed that the tribunal
might decide ex aeguo et bono, provision 3 of Article 42 would seem to
enable the tribunal to depart from applicable law for giving its award.
All similar occasions will put the arbiters into the shoes of amiagables
composedores in Spanish law or amiables compositeursI1 7 in French Law.
As has been observed, the authority of a court to decide a dispute ex
aeguo et bono:
relieves the Court from the necessity of deciding
according to law. It makes possible a decision based
upon considerations of fair dealing and good faith,
which may be independent of or even contrary to the
law. Acting ex aeguo et bono, the court is not
compelled to depart from applicable law, but it is
permitted to do so, and it may even call upon a party
to give up legal rights .... Such considerations
depend, in large measure, upon judges' personal
appreciation and yet the court would not be justified
in reaching a result which could not be explained on
rational ground.118
Although these words of Hudson were with reference to Article 38 of
the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and the role
of the judges in the court, they are relevant in a study dealing with
Article 42(3) of the charter of the ICSID. Actually, Article 42(3) is an
alternative basis for arbitration if the disputing parties before the
tribunal wish to avoid a decision on the basis of pure rules of law. In
the ICSID arbitration in Benvenuti & Bonfant Co. v. People's Republic of
The Congo,119 the tribunal used this alternative method to render an
award.1 4u
E. Municipal Law v. International Law
The review of Article 42 leaves unanswered the question: Which rule
of law will survive in a conflict between the rule of municipal law and
the rule of international law? For instance, say the tribunal faces a
legal issue relating to the expropriation of a private investment without
compensation. In this hypothetical situation, the municipal legislation
of the host state bans the state from giving any kind of adequate,
prompt, and effective compensation to the foreign investor. It is
possible that the existing rule of international law is not consistent
with this particular state legislation. At this point, the tribunal may
be confused as to which law should be accepted in the absence of any
specific direction from the parties. However, the present writer
presumes that the ICSID tribunal has discretionary power to apply
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international law in such occasion. The rationale behind this
presumption is the incorporation of "rules of international law" by
Article 42 to the Convention as a step not found in common arbitral
practices. In addition, the intention expressed by the delegates of the
various countries who participated in different regional meetings and
legal committee meetings and views expressed by the officials of the
ICSID, also provide reasonable grounds for this conclusion that rules of
international law will pre-empt the law of host state in the instance of
a conflict between them.121 In fact, the ICSID tribunal which presided
over the arbitration proceedings between AGIP Spa v. The People's
Republic of the Congo1 22 followed the same legal philosophy that the
international law will pre-empt the law of the contracting state, the
People's Republic of Congo, since the latter was in conflict with the
principles of international law.
An argument of the late Professor Schwarzenberger lends support to
the right of the tribunal of the ICSID to apply international law in
cases of conflicts with national law whenever necessary. He states: "If
the arbitration tribunals under the Convention were international
tribunals, they would have to apply their own lex fori, which is
international law."'12 3
One can easily identify the ICSID tribunals as international
tribunals, because the documents of the ICSID Convention reveal that the
Convention was basically designed to establish international arbitral
machinery to which private individuals and corporations could have
substantially the same access as state claimants have to the
International Court of Justice.124 Therefore, the right of the ICSID
tribunal to apply its lex fori, international law, is unquestionable.
F. General Principles of Law and the ICSID Tribunal
It must also be pointed that Article 42 and, subsidiarily, Article 48
of the ICSID Convention make possible the acceptance of certain new
principles of law within the scope of international law which would be
particularly appropriate to apply in arbitration proceedings relating to
transnational economic development contracts (TEDC). This possibility
would allow ICSID's arbitral mechanism to achieve a unique position12
among the existing institutional arrangements in the international
arbitration field. The development of new general principles of law
would be a by-product of the decision-making process of the ICSID
tribunal as a result of the resolution of the question of choice of law.
In other words, the ICSID tribunal, which applies various prescribed
legal systems such as the municipal law of the contracting state or
international law (due to the failure of the parties to select an
arbitration law) and finds gaps in those legal systems or conflicts among
them, may make use of certain principles and rules of law from other
available legal systems in order to give a just and impartial award.
There is a long history of international courts and tribunals making use
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of general principles taken from other legal systems to fill gaps in the
corpus of international law and so to permit the finding of a fair
solution to a particular legal dispute.126 Furthermore, authority for
such a development can be specifically found in two articles of the ICSID
Convention.
First, there is the specific directive of Article 42(2) which says,
"The Tribunal may not bring in a finding of non liquet on the ground of
silence or obscurity of the law." One can readily imagine circumstances
where, due to this prohibition of Article 42(2), the tribunal will be
forced to search for appropriate general principles and rules from other
available legal systems such as the municipal law of the investor's state
or the law of a third state when the body of customary public
international law principles does not seem to cover satisfactorily the
situation in dispute.127 The acceptance of general principles of law
would be logical to an arbitral tribunal which applies international law,
because general principles of law are considered recognized sources for
the enrichment of international law. Furthermore, the founding fathers
of the ICSID have permitted the ICSID tribunals to apply international
law (defined under Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice and designed originally to apply in the disputes between
sovereign states) to a dispute between a private party and a sovereign
state.128
The second reason concerns the absolute requirement provided by
Article 48(3) which says, "The award shall deal with every question
submitted to the Tribunal, and shall state the reasons upon which it is
based." When the tribunal states each reason which leads to a particular
award, the tribunal must support that reason with certain legal
principles and rules, since the issues involved with the disputes are
legal issues.129
Thus, though there is no rule of stare decisis in international law
or in the arbitration process, whenever the ICSID tribunal accepts
general principles and rules from other legal systems and applies such
principles and rules to an arbitration relating to a TEDC, the future
ICSID tribunal automatically gets an opportunity to interpret and develop
such principles and rules for application to similar legal disputes in
the future. Such new principles of law might appropriately be termed,
"principles of transnational economic development law," since they would
have been generated in a form suitable for application to arbitration
directly linked with transnational economic development contracts. This
product of the ICSID tribunal would not only make ICSID tribunals unique,
especially useful, and acceptable to parties with TEOC disputes, but also
could be used by other tribunals faced with similar disputes once ICSID
tribunals had "found" these priciples to be a part of international law.
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PART THREE: RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE ICSID AWARD
Articles 53, 54, and 55 deal exclusively with various provisions on
recognition and enforcement of an award granted by an ICSID tribunal.
The award will be binding on the parties to the dispute. No appeal or
other remedy is permitted except as provided by the Convention under
Articles 51 and 52. Although the award is final and mandatory on the
parties, it is subject to two remedies which are available in rare
situations: (1) revision on the ground of newly discovered facts and
(2) annulment because of serious procedural errors. These remedies must
be exhausted under the auspices of ICSID. If any dispute as to the
meaning or scope of the award arises, either party may request
interpretation of the award by a petition to the Secretary General of the
ICSID. The Secretary General will submit the petition to the tribunal
which rendered the award or, under certain circumstances, to a newly
constituted tribunal.13 0 The tribunal may, if it considers that the
circumstances so require, stay enforcement of the award pending its final
decision. However, once the award becomes final, it is not subject to
challenge on any ground in the courts of any country. Each disputant
must abide by and comply with the terms of the award.1 31
Each contracting state (country) to the ICSID Convention must
recognize the award as binding. Each state must enforce all monetary or
financial obligations imposed by that award within its jurisdiction as if
it were a final judgment by a court of that particular country. Further,
a country with a federal constitution must enforce such award in or
through its federal courts and provide that such courts treat the award
as a final judgment of the courts of a constituent state. 132
The ICSID Convention has provided a simple and effective procedure to
recognize and enforce awards. Any party to an ICSID award may obtain
recognition and enforcement of the award by furnishing to the competent
court or other authority designated in advance by each contracting
country a copy of the award certified by the Secretary General of
ICSID.1 33 This procedure eliminates the problems common to the
recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards which subsist in
local laws or under international conventions, including the 1958 New
York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards. 134 Under the ICSID Convention there is no exception, not even
on the basis of public policy, to the binding character of ICSID awards
and to their recognition and enforcement by contracting countries.13 5
The recognition and enforcement rules of ICSID awards are independent
from other prevailing rules regarding measures of execution following
recognition and enforcement.136 In this respect Article 55 provides
that the procedure established in Article 54 cannot be construed as
derogating from the laws in force in any contracting countries relating
to sovereign immunity of the country or of any foreign country from
execution. In the opinion of Georges Delaume, the Convention with this
provision surrenders measures of execution to domestic rules of
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immunity. 13 7 Under another view Article 55 requires that contracting
countries equate an ICSID award with the final judgment of a national
court to the extent permitted by the practice of that country regarding
sovereign immunity. However, it is expected that appropriate judicial
bodies in contracting countries will not create obstacles to the
effective immunity consideration. It is presumed that the local court
will acknowledge that by ratifying the Convention all contracting
countries have already implicitly waived all jurisdictional claims
against foreign courts under those countries' sovereign immunity
policy.1 38  In other words, the courts should rule that the contracting
countries who uphold sovereign immunity were aware of the "anticipatory
consequence" of an ICSID award being referred to local execution free
from all immunity issues. By signing the Convention those countries have
consented to refrain from invoking any of the traditional obstacles
involved with their sovereign immunity policy. Therefore, the present
writer strongly believes that domestic courts of contracting countries
will facilitate speedy recognition, enforcement and execution of an ICSID
award irrespective of traditional objections arising out of sovereign
immunity considerations.
In 1981 two domestic courts, one in Paris (Benvenuti & Bonfant Co.,
v. People's Republic of The Congo) 139 and another in Washington, D.C.,
(Maritime International Nominee Establishment v. Republic of
Guinea),14u reviewed petitions based on ICSID arbitration-related
cases. The Court of Appeals of Paris examined a lower court decision
(Tribunal da Grande Instance--the Court of First Instance) on recognition
of an ICSID award granted from an arbitration arrangement in Benvenuti &
Bonfant Co. v. People's Republic of The Congo and removed a restriction
imposed by the latter court on the execution of that award. This is the
first decision of a domestic court in a contracting country which
recognized the finality of an ICSID award. By removing the
restriction1 41 the Court of Appeals of Paris upheld the unique
advantages of an ICSID award, in contrast to ordinary foreign arbitral
awards. As soon as an ICSID award is recognized, it becomes a valid
title on which basic measures of execution can be taken, e.g., in the
form of attachment. This may not be the case with other arbitration
awards granted by arbitral tribunals which are not established by
intergovernmental conventions.
On January 12, a 1982 United States District Court in Washington,
D.C., decided in the matter of the arbitration in Maritime International
Nominees Establishment (MINE) v. The Republic of Guinea,14Z that (1)
Guinea's agreement to arbitrate before ICSID constituted a waiver of
immunity under the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA), and (2) a
dispute arising out of such an agreement was within the jurisdiction of
the United States District Court. On the basis of these findings, the
District Court granted a petition filed by MINE to enforce an ex parte
arbitration award given by an American Arbitration Association7AAAT
tribunal against the Republic of Guinea. According to the records, MINE
unilaterally refused to submit the dispute to the ICSID's jurisdiction
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and initiated an AAA arbitration. Presently this case is being reviewed
by the United States Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia. In
filing a brief for the U.S. Government as intervenor, the United States
Department of Justice argued that (1) the consent to ICSID jurisdiction
is not a waiver of sovereign immunity in its entirety, other than for
purposes of enforcing an ICSID award, and (2) the ICSID may have
exclusive jurisdiction over this particular dispute between MINE and
Guinea. The final outcome of this case may not be available for some
time. These two cases above mentioned point out the unique nature of the
ICSID arbitrations which may be beyond the reach of traditional domestic
judicial processes affecting recognition and enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards.
CONCLUSION
In light of the above discussion on the operational structure of
ICSID, arbitration law applicable to its proceedings, and issues relating
to the enforcement of its awards, it becomes clear that ICSID creates a
unique dispute-settling agency which is capable of satisfactorily
resolving legal disputes arising out of investment contracts abroad.
Although the ICSID has granted only three arbitration awards and is not
yet involved in more than eleven arbitration proceedings, this is a
reflection of the praiseworthy sense of discipline that the contracting
countries and their nationals have in relation to transnational economic
development activities. Aron Broches, former Secretary General of ICSID,
has stated that although there is no conventional statistical standard by
which to measure the usefulness of the Center, the real test of its
performance is the degree to which parties to investment agreements are
willing to commit themselves in advance to its settlement procedures
should the occasion arise. In this sense ICSID has made much substantial
progress during the past several years: provision for ICSID jurisdiction
was contained in more agreements, in the investment legislation of more
developing countries and in more bilateral agreements between developed
and developing countries.
It is hoped that more countries and foreign private investors will
recognize the potential of ICSID's arbitration mechanism, which is
capable of resolving questions of choice of law through equitable and
impartial techniques. It is also hoped that more countries and foreign
private investors will seek the facilities offered by this mechanism for
the settlement of legal disputes arising out of investment. 143 This
recognition and the increased use of ICSID's arbitration process as more
countries sign the 1965 World Bank Convention and submit disputes for
arbitration will without doubt create a healthy atmosphere in
transnational investment activities and will encourage a larger flow of
private transnational investment which will in turn promote the economic
development of emerging countries.
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